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Humanistic Mathematics: Personal Evolution and Excavations 
 
Stephen I. Brown 
May 9, 2002 
Preliminary Remarks 
 
Professionals from many different disciplines and perspectives who frequently do little more 
than greet each other politely, have come to appreciate, acknowledge, and even communicate with each 
other. Those interested in exploring a diversity of fields in relation to mathematics have set up tents 
around a bon fire that was lit by Alvin White's newsletter, Humanistic Mathematics Network of 1986 - a 
newsletter that officially became a journal in 1993. Fields as diverse as cognitive psychology, education, 
history, literature, linguistics, history, philosophy, and poetry are represented in the journal. This journal 
has also inspired the humanistic mathematics movement, now represented by a well attended topic group 
at the annual meeting of the American Mathematical Society and Mathematical Association of America. 
In addition, it has been acknowledged as an emerging force in a recent international handbook of 
mathematics education published in The Netherlands. From a personal point of view, the journal has 
meant a great deal, not only because of the direct impact of its articles, but more importantly because it 
was a contributing factor in giving me the courage to write about and integrate a variety of fields - a feat 
that stretched considerably the bounds of my expertise. 
 
With much appreciation for such encouragement, I reflect in this essay on the evolution of my 
own writing about the concept of humanistic mathematics. I do so by setting my first publication on the 
topic in bas relief against my writing that emerged some thirty years later. I will not in this brief space 
(shades of Fermat and his marginal note!) have a chance to paint the variety of self-portraits that emerged 
over this time span. I will, however, point to a number of contributing factors that influenced the change. 
I propose this act of introspection as a case study of one person's struggle with new ideas. 
 
My first article, published in 1973, that explicitly highlighted the word "humanistic" was 
playfully entitled "Mathematics and Humanistic Themes: Sum Considerations" (MHT). The evolved 
book, published in 2001 is less playfully entitled, Reconstructing School Mathematics: Problems with 
Problems and the Real World (RSM). As I look back at MHT, it becomes clear to me that this article 
planted the seeds for much of my subsequent writing. Perhaps the most dominant theme -maybe an 
obsession- has been a focus on problems and their educational uses. As will be obvious when I discuss 
some of the humanistic categories, part of that focus is ameliorative with regard to problems. That is, I 
point out "near relatives" of such concepts as problem solving, and indicate the educational 
shortsightedness of excluding them from the educational scene. 
 
Though it may be a bit of a procrustean bed, three of the four themes that I use in comparing the 
evolutionary stages described in the next two sections are the same. They are: (1) world and self; (2) 
"why?"; and (3) problems. 
 
An Initial Foray 
 
MHT is set against the backdrop of two curriculum agendas of the early 1960s that influenced 
almost all of the school disciplines: the "structure of the disciplines" movement and "discovery learning." 
In mathematics, the focus at all levels from elementary school through graduate school was upon 
uncovering at every stage the fundamental axiomatic nature of the subject. In the elementary and 
secondary levels, it focused not only on deductive proof but upon having students "discover" rather than 
being taught explicitly what these principles were (Bruner, 1960 and Brown 1971, 1976). Apologies for 
the sexist language throughout my piece, but few of us knew any better in those days. There are too many 
male references to (sic) the reader beyond the first time it appears. 
 
World and "Self” 
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The article begins with the following remarks about missing elements of “self” and how one 
views the world. 
 
If one starts with the hypothesis that aspects of mathematics learning could have 
an impact on the way one conducts his life (sic) and views the world in other 
domains as well, what are some of the possible mind-expanding ways in which it 
might be conceived? ... It is unquestionable that the "structure of the disciplines" 
movement of the past fifteen years solved some problems in the past decade for 
some people. ... Supposedly there was de-emphasis of such bugaboos as rote 
memory and drill and a renaissance of understanding and discovery. 
 
No matter how exciting and successful such an enterprise might have been... this 
development of the past decade and a half was bound to be uneventful from at 
least one point of view: impact on students as human beings living in a 
complicated and problematic world. The basic question asked by curriculum 
designers was: How might I best convey the nature of mathematics (especially 
the twentieth century spirit) to youngsters? A much more daring question 
[would] be: How might we use mathematics (among an arsenal of other things) to 
convey knowledge and attitudes towards the world and about oneself that would 
be valuable in many non-mathematical contexts [as well]? (pp. 191192). 
 
I explored what I meant by “self” in reflecting upon the activity of milking one problem in 
considerable detail. I selected a famous arithmetic progression- the Gauss problem of finding the sum of 
the natural numbers from 1 to 100. The myth goes that this is a problem that Gauss' fifth grade teacher 
gave her students in order to be able to do some desk work, thinking that she would be able to keep her 
class occupied for an extended period of time. Of course, the famous Gauss got the answer in less than a 
minute by doing something akin to noticing that the first and last numbers added to 101, and that the 
second and penultimate terms added to 101, and that the third and second from last added to 101, and so 
forth. From this a general pattern emerges, and it of course would not be difficult to prove by induction 
that a good summary of that scheme would be: (n+1) · (n / 2) 
  
Impressive as that insight is, I chose to see the problem from a number of alternative points of 
view. I came up with different algebraic ways of seeing how one could generalize the solution to finding 
the sum of the first n natural numbers depending upon (1) whether the last number was even or odd, (2) 
whether each term was given its "proper" value or rather was assigned an imagined "constant phantom 
value" regardless of the actual value of each term. This may seem a bit cryptic without repeating the 
detailed analysis in the article, but the general point that I raised was the following: If we choose n to 
stand for the last number, all formulas can easily be shown to be logically equivalent to: (n · (n+1)) / 2
 
" Why "? 
 
The above encapsulation, however, does not answer the question of why anyone might expect 
them all to be the same (especially for the progressions that had different parity). There is a formal 
connection that is revealed in a deductive proof that arrives at equivalent expressions, but no amount of 
formal proof is persuasive in the sense that we might have anticipated that the different formulations for 
odd and even last numbers would be equivalent. But is there a deep connection that indicates a priori that 
the formula for the sum should be independent of parity. In the article, I explored that formulation via the 
following well known sketch: 
 
S = 1 + 2 +... + (n-1) + n 
 
S = n + (n- 1) +... + 2 + 1 
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2S = (n+l) + (n+l) +... + (n+l) + (n+l) 
 
Thus, S  =  (n, · (n+l))/ 2 
 
As revealing as the proof is, something is still missing. This proof only further entrenches the 
question "why?" for though it works, we are left with the mystery of figuring out how it is (why?) anyone 
ever came up with the idea of writing the sum first in ascending and then in descending order as a starting 
point. When we think of the sum of numbers from 1 to n as a staircase of sorts, however, and see it as 
almost a rectangle (if only a second set of stairs were rotated and placed on top of it), we can begin to 
imagine how anyone would have come up with bizarre re-formulation of the problem in terms of getting 
twice the sum. That is, we begin to understand what motivated the selection of a peculiar algebraic trick 
only after we have allowed ourselves to think of the problem in geometric terms. 
 
The geometric conception of the problem enables us to move beyond purely formal connections 
between odd and even progressions, and to come up with a deep connection. In seeking the educational 
potential of such categories as formal, surface, and deep connections among problems, however, I 
suggest caution in disparaging what might be considered to be shallow associations. Consider the 
following from MHT: 
 
What can we learn from this problem? Max Wertheimer and other gestalt 
psychologists in analyzing this problem have placed primary emphasis upon 
blind and deep discoveries and applaud approaches that are insightful. Thus 
Wertheimer finds fault with students who approach the problem of finding a 
desired sum by combining two sums written beneath each other and handled 
algebraically. He would claim that though technically correct, it is blind to inner 
meanings of the ideas. I think his emphasis is misguided, though he provides an 
intelligent first approximation for the analysis of an important educational issue. 
Notice that the form of the deep answer gotten by writing the algebraic sum 
twice was what might have inspired us to search for a geometric solution that is 
deep in the sense that it does not depend upon parity. 
 
It is not that we ought to abhor and eliminate solutions that lack depth in the 
sense that they do not get at the inner workings of the mathematics. Instead we 
would like to suggest as a worthwhile educational program the explicit analysis 
of problems along the dimensions of surface, deep andformal similarity and 
differences. When is the similarity in approach only one of surface similarity 
(e.g. when the only connection might be that the same words are used for the 
problems that otherwise share no common ground)? When is the connection a 
formal one? When deep? More importantly how can we learn to encourage 
valuable thought by searching for interaction among and between these three 
categories? (p. 199). 
 
But where does the “self” come in as we review some of these mathematical issues? Part of the 
answer is that comparisons along the three dimensions (surface, formal and deep) is not automatically 
given, but rather is negotiable. In discussing these categories and how they bear upon their own view of 
the world, students not only apply them to mathematical as well as nonmathematical experiences in the 
world, but can be encouraged to criticize and extend them as well. In doing so, they are engaging in a 
fundamental human act -that of comparing objects. The point is that any two things in the universe are the 
same or different with regard to some criteria. Furthermore, we can come to realize that frequently there 
is considerable ambiguity with regard to implicit criteria of comparison when we ask "why" two things 
are the same or different. It is sometimes a rude awakening to realize that we intended something other 
than we thought only when we receive an answer to a "why" that feels uncomfortable (Brown, 1982).Our 
future as a civilization may very well rest in our ability to see the many with regard to categories that are 
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common across diverse languages and cultures. A great deal of interpersonal as well as international 
conflict is a result of our finding differences rather than similarities with regard to human qualities. 
Understanding the functioning of with regard to and the ambiguity of why may go a long way in affecting 
self-understanding. Mathematics, with its fundamental concern with what it is that ostensibly different 
systems share - the foundation stone of the concept of isomorphism structures - offers an interesting 
entrée in thinking about such issues. 
 
Elegance 
 
Elegance is a concept that is difficult to define, but its attributes frequently include the following: 
(1) an elegant solution is brief (relative to competing ones); (2) the solution involves a creation that is 
unexpected; (3) once created, an elegant solution is relatively easy (sometimes) to understand; (4) elegant 
solutions have the potential to open new ways not only of understanding a particular problem, but of 
creating new ones. 
 
Many of my colleagues agree that one of the most elegant solutions they have come across is that 
of Euclid's proof that there are an infinite number of primes. It is unexpected in that "out of the blue" he 
creates a new number based upon any given number of primes (their product plus the number 1). 
Furthermore though it is not known whether that new number is itself prime or composite, Euclid's 
analysis reveals that it makes no difference in terms of the large picture- that one new prime number must 
exist. The proof is easy to follow (and even to complete once the number is presented on a platter), but 
ironically is a bit slippery for many people first seeing it to not appreciate that it is irrelevant whether or 
not the new number is prime. It is not hard to appreciate that his proof also raises a number of other 
questions to explore. 
 
In MHT, I began to explore an aspect of elegance that I had not appreciated before. That is, it is 
one thing to come up with a definition of elegance. It is another, however to lay out the terrain within 
which elegance might reside. Thus: 
 
It should be obvious in the example of the infinitude of primes that we have been 
referring to elegance with regard to one aspect of mathematics, and the one that is 
most widely associated with mathematics - namely proof. ... Where else might 
we look for elegance in mathematics? We might look ... at the statements of 
theorems (or conjectures for that matter) in mathematics. What are some 
assertions that are elegant ones? One that comes to mind is the Fundamental 
Theorem of Integral Calculus. Here we are told that in order to evaluate a 
particular function - the definite integral - we must consider which family of 
functions that function is a derivative of. That is, two functions that are 
conceptually distinct on the surface - the definite integral, intuitively seen as an 
area, and the derivative, seen as the slope of a tangent line to a curve at a point - 
are found to be linked in an unsuspected way. Analogous to (2) above for proof, 
this statement connects up concepts that at first glance could not look more 
unrelated (p. 201). 
 
The above remarks are just a beginning. I leave it to the reader to come up with aspects of 
mathematical thinking other than statements and proofs about which the concept of elegance might apply. 
Armed with some of the above thinking about the concept of elegance, I decided to investigate it further 
with a class of my graduate students. I was in for a surprise. 
 
Using the array of solutions to Gauss' arithmetic progression problem, I had them select what 
they thought were the most elegant ones. One student chose what appeared to me to be a very messy 
algebraic solution. When asked to describe what made it elegant, she confided that after spending a long 
amount of time coming up with a rather complicated way of combining odd and even terms for any 
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progression, she wanted to find a way of honoring the process rather than streamlining it in favor of some 
final step. She wanted to find a way that would encapsulate how she had gotten there rather than what the 
actual "there" was. In some sense then, she was interested in capturing the personal genealogy of the 
problem -- how it unfolded in her own analysis. 
 
Whether dealing with an array of problems, or of many different approaches to the same problem, 
as the above remarks indicate, elegance is a concept that lends itself to personal understanding. Here is 
how I described the potential to understand "self” in relation to elegance in MHT: 
 
Of the many different approaches to [a] problem some are more plodding and some more elegant. ... If 
one is exposed to or encouraged to generate an abundant number of elegant and inelegant approaches, 
then new questions and categories regarding individual styles of operating may emerge. What are some of 
the important variables that affect the ways in which we operate with regard to an elegant vs. a plodding 
approach to problems that exist around us? To what extent are we affected by [feelings of] 
self-consciousness? [by the] clarity of problem? [by] the source of initiation of a problem [text book, 
teacher, another student, oneself]? (p. 212). 
 
Problem Posing: From Problem Solving to Problem Posing 
 
With this last array of questions, I found myself moving from elegance towards a theme that had 
just begun to capture my interest, that of problem posing - a theme that was to become more and more 
explicit in later years. I was wondering about the kinds of personal choices people can make in their 
exploration of mathematical idea. The idea is suggested below: 
 
[One] dimension of choice ... deals with the distinction between posing and 
solving problems. We have become accustomed to thinking of mathematics as an 
enterprise involving our attempts to solve, but rarely to pose problems, though in a 
most basic sense, it is ... impossible to solve a problem without posing some 
related ones along the way. Once we have gained some experience and been 
exposed to strategies of posing problems, how can we use [them] as a springboard 
for reflecting on ourselves as posers or solvers? How do we tend to pose 
problems? Under what circumstances do we do so? In what ways does our 
vacillation between solving and posing in mathematics suggest alternatives or 
reflect itself in the way we operate in other spheres as well? How does our ability 
or inability to pose problems (or our inclination/disinclination to do so) tend to 
define us with regard to notions such as authority (who's in charge), self respect 
and the like? (p. 212). 
 
MHT summarizes briefly the bare bones of a specific problem posing strategy as well as a mind 
set, that we called What-If-Not. Beginning in 1969, Marion Walter and I began to explore the 
What-If-Not scheme in several articles. In MHT, there is a description of the strategy as well as a 
rationale for its having humanistic import: 
 
The following steps capture the essence of the What-If-Not process: 
 
 making observations of a phenomenon presented  
 drawing implications from these ... observations  
 using the phenomenon to imagine alternatives to it 
 negating some of the [assumptions] of the phenomenon  
 [asking] new questions 
 
This activity can be thought of as a means towards incorporating an abstraction 
that is "out there" in such a way that we begin to gain power over it and to feel 
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that we possess it in some important sense. This kind of "tasting" activity is one 
that we tend to by-pass if our focus is primarily upon solving "it." Unfortunately 
however if we persist in by-passing this activity very long, we desensitize 
ourselves to the point that we no longer "taste" the uniqueness among 
phenomena, and though [we] may he able to gain answers to questions [we] 
become ... insensitive to what it means for something to be a problem and have 
even less of an understanding of what it means to have solved something (p. 209- 
210). 
 
 It is interesting how idiosyncratic (and hence related to "self") the very first step described above 
is. That is, not only do people make different observations of a problem or a situation, but they frequently 
do not even "see" what is supposedly there in the first place. We shall discuss this further in the next 
section. 
 I turn now to how some of these ideas were transformed over a thirty year span. 
 
Evolution 
 
An important question that was raised with regard to the Gauss problem was "why?" One of the 
most powerful human desires - to know why - is filled with ambiguity, and our obligation as individuals 
and as a community is as much to engage in a dialogue that enables us to figure out what we are asking 
when we ask the innocent sounding "why?" as it is to try to come up with answers. We have seen that 
"why" might be a search for logical proof, but it can seek other dimensions. It could mean, "Why did 
anyone come to see this problem in this way?” It could be a search for personal motivation. i.e. Why was 
anyone ever interested in this problem in the first place, or why should I be interested in this problem at 
this time in these circumstances? Am I driven by educational concerns? Pressure to conform for a variety 
of reasons? 
 
"Why?”: Its Relation to Mathematical Progress 
 
There are other aspects of "why?" that transcend specific problems, and our twentieth century 
focus on problem solving (especially from a technological point of view) has tended to desensitize us to 
viewing the larger landscape. It was in the act of asking what we tend to mean when we speak of talent as 
a problem solver that I came to see problem solving in a more global light. In RSM, I comment: 
 
Despite the powerful tug of problem solving as the sine qua non of mathematical 
progress, there is a competing story to be told on the centrality of problem solving 
within the discipline. ... It was not ... a genius that was needed in order to prove 
once and for all that Euclid's fifth postulate was provable from the others. Rather 
what was needed was a different sort of insight. One had to see that the problem 
was in some sense flawed as it was stated. Furthermore entire disciplines ... are 
sometimes transformed not necessarily by new solutions to problems per se, but 
rather by new ways of "situating" ... already solved problems in a new 
environment. (p. 94) 
 
An example on a grander scale involves the inclination to ask why we should conceive of a field 
as we do. The Erlanger program in Germany is a sterling example of asking such a question. Felix Klein 
in 1872 completely redefined what inquiry in the field of geometry was all about, not only by solving 
new problems in the conventional sense, but rather by viewing the entire enterprise differently - from the 
perspective of transformations. It is never problems and their solutions alone that enable us to classify a 
field of inquiry. Rather it is the human act of deciding what are pleasing, elegant, economical, 
challenging ways of viewing the field itself. We are never interested in solutions per se, but in solutions 
that are driven by other concerns as well. 
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Analogies for re-conceiving the class room that derive from this alternative view of progress and 
problem solving are explored in RSM: 
 
It is not only interesting for diagnostic purposes to find out what a student thinks 
a unit or a field of inquiry is about. Rather, a class record of its perception 
regarding the nature of a topic being studied for several weeks, months, or even 
an entire semester would reveal not only how students see what it is all about in 
some general sense, but how their viewpoint relates to the problems they 
entertain. Here it would be valuable to record dissenting opinions as well as 
popularly held points of view. It would also be enlightening to see how and why 
perceptions change over time. It is not that problem solving is irrelevant in 
defining and reconstructing what a field is all about. It is rather that a quite 
different kind of problem is addressed whenever an effort is made to make sense 
out of a variety of mathematical and educational experiences (p. 95). 
 
One of the most enlightening experiences I had with regard to students' understanding of scope [of a 
field] occurred several years ago when I spent a semester observing a seventh-grade accelerated algebra 
class. 
 
The teacher had devoted considerable time teaching the concept of "unknown." 
She had done so imaginatively and was interested in having the students not only 
manipulate expressions, but understand what a variable was all about. After 
several weeks had passed, I interviewed Debby, whom the teacher described as 
the best student she ever had. ... I asked her : What do you expect to learn next 
semester when you study more algebra? I anticipated that she might talk about 
more complicated expressions and equations to solve, new systems of numbers, 
possible applications to other non-mathematical areas, possible ways to view 
what they had learned from a different point of view. Instead she answered, "I 
will finally learn what these x's and y's really are." (p. 85). 
 
Debby obviously had an agenda that was quite different from her teacher's. She was letting me 
know that she hoped that someday these "unknowns" would be become "knowable." It was almost as if 
she was paraphrasing from the Bible-now she sees through a glass darkly; then she will see clearly. It is 
not necessarily that Debby had to be "set straight." After all, I am not sure she would be able to hear what 
the field was about from a teacher's point of view at this stage. It was, however, helpful for the teacher to 
know how her agenda and that of this student were in conflict. It is even conceivable that this young 
student is on the verge of seeing a view that would transform the field, much as Felix Klein did over a 
century before. It would be instructive, however for teachers at all levels to take regular snapshots of their 
students' perception of what the field they are studying is all about, where they think it came from and 
where it might be headed. After all, these sorts of global snapshots are implicitly responding to another 
why that is often suppressed, namely, "Why are we studying this problem? unit? course?" 
 
Genealogy, History and Pseudo-history 
 
We have not yet introduced the role of history as a humanistic aspect of mathematics. Surely an 
historical appreciation for the history of a problem, of a branch of a discipline and of the discipline itself 
would be an important component of a humanistic approach to any field. Doing so in such a way that it 
relates the discipline not only to other fields of inquiry, but more generally to the culture from which it 
emerged would enable us to better appreciate how the mind of a creator is connected with the civilization 
that spawns her (no sic). 
 
Without such contextualizing, for example, it is hard to understand why it is that despite the fact 
that Euclid had a first rate appreciation for the concept of area, and could in fact tell how the areas of any 
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two polygonal figures compare (one being less than, same, or greater than the other area), there is not one 
formula for the area of a plane geometric figure anywhere in Euclid's Elements (Heath, 1956).This is an 
observation that is a shocker to most people who have studied Euclidean geometry. Imagine how you 
would prove (as Euclid did) that two triangles on the same base with their vertices on a line parallel to the 
base, have the same area, if you do not know any formula for the area of a triangle (Brown, 1993). 
 
Studying the history of mathematics, however, is not the only way of gaining an appreciation for 
what it is that history is about. There are indeed forms of historical thinking that have been implicit in 
some of our discussion of genealogy and of the different interpretations of the meaning of "why?" as 
well. The student who selected what I thought was an inelegant summary of her inquiry about arithmetic 
progressions was telling me that she craved a way of comparing where she was with where she ended up 
in the analysis of the problem. 
 
The aspect of "why?" that essentially asked why anyone might have come up not only with a 
solution, but with a conjecture in the first place is implicitly enticed by an appreciation for history. Even 
when we cannot produce evidence for how it is that an idea evolved, we can ask an hypothetical 
historical-type question: How might this idea have evolved? 
 
There are surely ways of investigating such a question that involves a great deal of information 
about the time and place of its origin. But it is also possible to investigate the question in such a way that 
each of us can use whatever resources we have at our disposal and imagine what might have been the 
circumstances that gave rise to the idea. I have dubbed that kind of personal inquiry "pseudo-history." In 
RSM, I discuss the use of pseudo-history with regard to Goldbach's famous conjecture of 1742. His 
conjecture asserts that any even number greater than two can be represented as the sum of two primes. 
Thus 12 = 5 + 7; 18 = 11 + 7; 28 = 5 + 23. Interestingly enough it took almost two centuries before this 
conjecture was even partially cracked-- something that was accomplished by the Russian mathematician, 
Schnirelman in 1931. Here is my description of pseudo-history in action: 
 
I imagined how [Goldbach] might have come up with [his] conjecture in the first 
place. ... There were many possible ways of imagining forerunners, but one that 
struck me as particularly revealing was the converse of that conjecture. That the 
sum of any two primes ... is even seemed so simple that almost nothing was 
needed to prove it. I imagined that Goldbach might have started with the 
simplistic converse and wondered what kinds of challenges could transform such 
a trivial observation into something worth thinking about (p. 197). 
 
When hard historical data is not available, feminist scholars frequently come to understand 
historical questions about women by encouraging other women to reflect upon their own family 
experiences and their own lived experiences - a powerful form of pseudo-history. I conclude by 
imagining how that model might be incorporated in the classroom - shades of our earlier discussion of 
"why?" 
 
Pseudo-history has become a commonplace in many fields that appear to be 
lacking in documentation of the past. Some feminists for example, have found it 
helpful in uncovering a sense of womanhood, to create a tapestry of their own 
history based upon threads that are personal rather than derived from scholarly 
sources. In that case, many women find it helpful to look inward as a community 
in order try to understand how women experience the world and how they 
learned to define themselves. This kind of activity can profitably engage students 
in all fields of inquiry. Borrowing from the feminist model, the classroom of the 
present can be a laboratory for history. That is, students can learn to keep a 
record of how their thinking/feeling evolves over time. What is real then is not 
what history as an official document stipulates, but rather how we create it from 
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within. It is a pretend history of sorts, but nothing could feel more real than to act 
as if we had created the history based upon our own lives. In such an 
environment, students could not only do explorations and reflect on them, but 
this activity could be part of the historical record of the course itself. A 
significant part of the curriculum would not only deal with problem solving, 
heuristics of problem solving and looking back at what they "discovered," but 
would help students recall the debates and differences of opinion that were 
expressed over a protracted period of time as the students themselves struggled to 
make sense of new ideas (p. 197). 
 
Problem Posing: From Problem Solving, to Problem Posing, to Problem 
 
 
Two major themes that propelled RSM are described in the two phrases following the colon 
(Problems with Problems and the Real World). The first is an effort to explore the traditional role of 
problems in mathematics education and to seek alternatives that have greater humanistic import. The 
second deals with our conception of mathematics and the real world. We turn first to the issue of 
problem. 
 
In MHT, I had begun to talk about problem posing as an integral component of problem solving. 
This is a theme that was developed in several essays and in two books that Marion Walter and I wrote on 
the topic: The Art of Problem Posing, and an associated collection of essays written by many of our 
colleagues, entitled, Problem Posing: Reflections and Applications. There we laid out the strategy for the 
What-If-Not scheme in considerable detail and further spoke of the centrality of problem posing in 
mathematical thinking. In RSM, I further elaborated upon the rationale for problem posing - speaking of 
its philosophical basis in the act of thinking, its educational relevance, and further elaborating its 
relationship to problem solving. 
 
There, however, I took a careful look at some foundational issues. These issues were motivated 
when I was surprised to discover answers to the following two questions by experienced teachers: (1) 
what are some good reasons for including problem solving in the curriculum?; (2) what are some good 
reasons for including problems in the curriculum? The reader might wish to try out two questions and 
compare their answers with a group of students at almost any level. The specific answers are not so 
critical for the purpose of raising these foundational questions. What is critical, however, is that the 
answers given are essentially the same regardless of which of the two questions is asked. 
 
What I saw was that teachers were essentially establishing an educational agenda - that of 
encouraging and enabling their own students to associate problems with problem solving. I wondered 
why this happened and began to explore the philosophical literature on the concept of problem itself. I 
was particularly struck by the fact that though there was a great deal of analysis of problem solving, 
especially in relation to thinking, there was very little in the analysis of the concept of problem itself. I 
summarized some interesting discussion from a number of people from twentieth century philosophical 
camps as follows: 
 
Though there are a number of alternative conceptions of problem and though 
there are many different conditions that seem to be part of its definition, the 
driving logical/ philosophical force is captured most sharply by Nickles. Recall 
that according to him, "a problem consists of all the conditions or constraints on 
the solution plus the demand that the solution be found." It is Nickles' clear 
statement of the demand condition linked with the desire for a solution, that 
contributes to the educational fallacy (p. 77). 
 
So we have the concept not only of solution, but of demand built into the concept of problem. I 
was drawn to the realization, however, that the definition of a phenomenon (even if appreciated 
implicitly) does not establish its use. Thus problems in educational settings need not accord with the 
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definition of problem. If a knife is defined as a sharp object with certain properties, that does not mean 
that it cannot be used as a paper weight, weight lifting object, magnetic attractor, art object, and so forth. 
 
This led me to define what I called a meta-fallacy and an educational fallacy. 
 
Meta Fallacy: Once we are clear about what we mean by problem, and how it 
relates to constraints, demand and solution, then an educational agenda flows 
from that conception (p.78). 
 
A clearer statement of what is involved in the fallacious leap is: 
 
Educational Fallacy: Given any problem, in order for it to be used for 
educational purposes, it is necessary that the goal ultimately be directed towards 
a possibly wide variety of efforts of students to solve that problem (p. 78) 
 
An attempt to confront these fallacies resulted in a full blown analysis of the various uses of 
problems, problem posing and problems solving. In particular, I explored how it is that problems could be 
a source for the creation not only of other problems (as in problem posing) but of situations (demand 
withdrawn or made more implicit) and vice versa. I comment on the educational value of the 
transformation of problem to situation as follows: 
 
To the extent that [a] question asked in [a problem creates] an insurmountable 
difficulty for many students, a program designed to "neutralize" problems so that 
they may become situations without a built-in demand might very well enable 
[them] to come to an understanding of "what the problem is." For many people, 
just removing the question at the end of [a problem] would transform a problem 
into a situation. For others, there may be a number of problems that remain that 
are implied in the description even if there is no explicit demand (p. 91). 
 
Consider now the possible humanistic import of the reverberation of problem and situation: 
 
As we move from the focus of creating problems from situations, and vice versa, 
to that of trying to understand what motivates some people to create some 
situations and others to create other situations or to why some kinds of problems 
or situations created are more appealing to some and not to others, we begin to 
participate in a dialogue that enables people to reflect on what they value and 
how they think. When we communicate with others about what we believe can be 
transformed from a problem to a situation, we tell each other what we "see" even 
when we may not state it explicitly. That most people do not notice that in 
defining prime numbers, for example, the domain of natural numbers is seen as 
salient (and thus capable of being transformed to some other set), tells us what 
they take for granted. Such an observation is an invitation to try to figure out 
what it is in our own lives that we take for granted and "do not see." It becomes a 
significant question then to figure out what it might be that enables us to "see" 
better or differently. There are surely occasions upon which tragic events can 
become the impetus to enable us to see what was not there before. It is possible to 
view tragedy as a form of What-If-Not. It represents the modification of a 
situation in such a way that we see the situation itself differently (p. 91, 92). 
 
Of course this is only a first step in exploring the educational potential of problems. In addition 
to finding ways of "neutralizing" problems into situations or vice versa, both mathematical and personal 
insights ensue when many other questions are considered, such as: Why am I being presented with this 
problem at this time? How does this problem relate to others like it that I have seen? Am I interested in 
pursuing this problem? Are there others who have a different interest in this problem than I? Why? Do I 
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understand this problem? What would it take for me to understand it better? Differently? What would it 
take to confuse me about this problem? 
 
Even when a solution is presented together with a problem, that pair can be a force to generate 
questions that have a humanistic focus beyond the solution itself. Here is some inquiry of that sort that I 
followed Euclid's proof of an infinite number of primes: 
 
 There obviously is a difference between coming up with a solution and being able to appreciate it once 
it is presented. Why should it have been so hard to come up with the above solution when it is so 
brief and relatively easy to follow? 
 Are there circumstances in each of our (non-mathematical) lives that exemplify the above principle: 
something hard to come up with but relatively simple and easy to appreciate once we have been made 
aware of it? 
 Frequently people experience mathematics as "plodding" and "obtuse." Have you come upon 
mathematical ideas other than this one that relate in an intuitive way to the concept of infinity. Might 
some of them fit the category of "elegance"? (Think about when you were very young and falling 
asleep … worrying about whether or not you might fall off the end of the universe.) 
 There is high irony in this solution from at least one point of view. In an effort to create this number K5, 
Euclid first produced a number that could not be less prime. That is before adding the number 1 at the end, he created the number  (p1 · p2 · p3 · p4 · p5). That number is the most non-prime number in Christendom. 
a) What might have been going on in Euclid's head that got him to make that move? Notice that he 
then added 1. Could he have added 2? 3? 
b) We are thinking of a temporal order of sorts in the creation of the number (p1 · p2 · p3 · p4 · p5) + 1. 
Do you think that is a legitimate way to think of a number? More precisely, we can think of (p1 · p2 
· p3 · p4 · p5) as being the first move and adding 1 to be the second move. From what points of 
view does this temporal concept make sense? What alternative ways are there of thinking of the 
number K5? (again realizing that 5 could be replaced by any value.) 
 A lot of people who see this proof for the first time think that the argument is that either i) is the case or ii) is the case. They believe that Euclid is claiming that ii) cannot be possible, and therefore we are left with i) -- that K5 in fact must be prime. Why do you believe people have this conception? Did you have it? 
 Before Euclid came up with the proof that there exists an infinite number of primes, you can imagine 
that some people (maybe even Euclid) were in doubt about the answer to the question "How many 
primes are there"? Can you put yourself in a position of such doubt? 
a) How would you create such doubt for yourself? 
b) Suppose there in fact were a finite number of prime numbers. What might the consequences be, and consequences for what? Where would you look  in attempting to find an answer to the question? (pp. 101-102) 
 
We turn now to the second theme of RSM- the relationship of mathematics to the real world. 
 
World and “Self” 
 
We arrive full circle to the first topic that we mentioned in discussing MHT. School 
curriculum is now more inclined to relate mathematics to the real world than has heretofore been 
the case. Furthermore, that connection is made not only in scientific fields, but in areas that are 
more closely aligned with the humanities. Here, for example, is a list of suggested topics 
mentioned in RSM for relating mathematics to the real world. It is found in a1989 document of 
the National Council of Teachers of Mathematics, Curriculum and Evaluation Standards for School 
Mathematics: 
 
 Art: the use of symmetry, perspective, spatial representations, and patterns (including fractals) to 
create original artistic works. 
 Biology: the use of scaling to identify limiting factors on the growth of various organisms. 
 Business: the optimization of a communication network. 
 Industrial arts: the use of mathematics-based computer-aided design in producing scale drawings or 
models of three-dimensional objects such as houses. 
 Medicine: modeling an inoculation plan to eliminate an infectious disease. 
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 Physics: the use of vectors to address problems involving forces. (p. 149) 
 
In that same document, they give the following as a secondary school example of applying 
mathematics to the real world. 
 
Suppose Anne tells you that under her old method of shooting free throws in 
basketball, her average was 60%. Using a new method of shooting, she scored 9 
out of her first 10 throws. Should she conclude that the new method really is 
better than the old method? (p. 172). 
 
RSM argues that such a conception of application is an interesting one, and in fact is more 
enticing than many of the contrived "word problems" that have for decades been the hall-mark of relating 
mathematics to the real world. Nevertheless, it is a truncated and skewed vision of the connection 
between mathematics and the real world. Focusing on the dominant use of mathematics as a model of a 
simplified "real world" situation, I comment on what is missing as follows: 
 
There is nothing inherently wrong with the notion of a model as far as it goes. In 
fact, much progress in the "real world" is achieved by so translating real-world 
problems. What is missing from an educational perspective, however, is that such 
a notion of application tends to isolate mathematics. That is, mathematics is 
frequently only a partial solution to real-world problems. Frequently one can go 
only so far with a mathematical analysis, and then it is necessary to introduce 
other dimensions of human thought and experience in order to think more about 
the problem (p. 16). 
 
RSM criticizes the world view that limits the connection to being essentially that of a model. I 
suggest the following modification of the basketball problem: 
 
A close relative of yours has been hit by an automobile. He has been unconscious 
for one month. The doctors have told you that unless he is operated upon, he will 
live but will most likely be comatose for the rest of his life. They can perform an 
operation which, if successful, would restore his consciousness. They have 
performed ten such operations in the past and have been successful in only two 
cases. In the other eight, the patient died within a week. What counsel would you 
give the doctors? (p. 142) 
 
What do these two problems have in common? Though they have some elements in common 
(e.g. probability applied to supposedly real world problems), the medical one goes beyond the need to 
reach a conclusion, but rather requires a decision. Furthermore, the medical rendition deals not only with 
mathematical problem solving, but with ethics as well. Here, we have to consider not only issues of 
probability, but rather we would be inclined to support an event of low probability. Not only do we need 
to know what the chances are that the person will survive, but we need to address the more salient 
question of what kind of life is worth living. 
 
But there are more important aspects that are missing when we make use of a "model mentality." 
Unlike the example of Anne and the basketball hoops, we cannot make an intelligent decision about what 
to do if our primary focus is on excluding irrelevancies. Rather, we need more rather than less 
information about our comatose friend. Here are some information we might wish to seek. 
 
We might want to know what sort of living will, if any, the person left. We might 
want to seek additional medical opinions rather than accept the conclusion about 
what might or might not be the result of performing the operation. In short, in 
order to make a wise decision, having a lot more information would be more 
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desirable than streamlining the real-world problem for the purpose of creating a 
workable mathematical model (pp. 142-3). 
 
In such real life situations, we thus relate mathematics to other fields of inquiry in a variety of 
ways other than that of using one as a model for another. The following suggests that we supplement the 
traditional scheme of model with the following kind of variation: 
 
 
 
 
This elaboration of model makes clear that rather than seeking to eliminating "garbage," we need 
rather to seek out new data (and incorporate them with values) in order to make wise real world decisions. 
Eventually, I end up supplanting the notion of model altogether in an attempt to seek commonalty 
between mathematics and other fields. I comment in RSM: 
 
A substantially different point of view is revealed as soon as we begin to 
relinquish a hold on mathematics that is rooted in a desire to see the field as 
totally different from other experiences in the world-as the deductive science par 
excellence, the science of necessary conclusions, or the field in which knowledge 
that is certain may be purchased to rejuvenate some other real-world 
phenomenon. With this acquiescence, we invite a point of view that asks a 
different sort of question. What is there in the way of thinking, experiencing, 
feeling that mathematics shares with other ways of experiencing the world? (p. 
145). 
 
Using this alternative view of connection, we are drawn to seek connections between 
mathematics and language, poetry, humor, morality, confusion and so forth. In RSM I explore questions 
like: How is mathematics like language? (Hersh, 1997; Brown, 1997). In what ways is mathematics itself 
a language? What is there that mathematics shares with poetry? With humor? Is mathematics itself 
humorous? How so? What does morality have to do with mathematics? 
 
While it is not possible to review the array of issues that derive from a more robust and less elitist 
view of the nature of mathematics, we can offer one example: that of humor. In the section on genealogy 
above, we mentioned Goldbach's conjecture of 1742, and the fact that the first crack was made by 
Schnirelman almost two centuries later. Recall that Goldbach's conjecture is that any even number greater 
than 2 can be represented as the sum of a pair of primes. What might represent a fanny first crack in 
solving that problem? One line of thought might be to focus on the number of natural numbers that have 
to be added in order to produce a sum that is prime. For small numbers we can actually verify that a pair 
can always be produced. For large numbers, the issue is more difficult. Can you come up with a pair for 
any even number greater than a million? While computer programming surely makes this task easier in a 
trial and error fashion, what do we do when we come up with an even number that is so large that we 
exceed the capacity of the computer? 
 
In pre-computer days, Schnirelman actually came up with a deductive proof that told us that no 
matter how large the even number was, it could be represented as the sum of a certain number of primes. 
Given that the conjecture seeks two as the answer, what would be a funny number of primes that 
Schnirelman could guarantee would do the trick? 
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Perhaps ten would be funny. Maybe 100, or perhaps 1000 would create a 
chuckle. Would the need to add 300,000 natural numbers instead of a pair create 
a belly laugh? That was Schnirelman's contribution to the problem. He showed 
that given any even number, we can find at most 300,000 primes that must be 
added in order to achieve it (p. 181). 
 
Why is 300,000 a funny answer? The incongruity between what is needed in most practical situations 
and what is considered to be appealing in mathematical discourse is frequently a source of high comedy. 
That sense of comedy is further exasperated by the fact that many mathematical proofs are existential in 
nature. As is the case with Schnirelman's proof, he offered no way of actually producing the primes 
needed for any even number; he only showed us that they must exist (at the peril of an internal 
inconsistency). 
 
In addition to asking how mathematics itself can be humorous, I look at some of the features of 
humor that are shared with at least some aspects of mathematics. Of the many possible commonalties, we 
mentioned one earlier. The element of surprise as a quality of elegance in mathematics is a central feature 
that both fields have in humor. 
 
Coda (but not some running no's) 
 
More than any other discipline, mathematics has been dominated by mischievous epistemological 
views. The field is popularly portrayed as impervious to doubt, scornful of the realization that the 
selection of what is considered relevant knowledge is a social construction, reluctant to engage in 
controversy or debate, disinclined to admit non-linear unraveling of ideas, and slow in acknowledging 
that cognition and emotionality are inextricably intertwined. Though at the time that I began writing 
about mathematics as a humanistic field, I was aware of the philosophical work of Gödel, and later about 
the contributions of Lakatos, it is only within the past decade or so that I have sought to connect those 
philosophical themes with issues of an educational nature (Brown, 1996a; Davis, 2001; Hofstadter, 1979; 
Lakatos, 1976; Nagel & Newman, 1987). If we think of unsolvability as an unwelcome guest of at least 
some of mathematics and if we believe that at least some of mathematics has problems that are virtually 
impossible to state with any degree of accuracy, (and that proof must yield to the primacy of 
counter-examples) then what sorts of text and what sorts of conversation are compatible with those 
views? 
 
This is a hard question to answer, partly because it is, appropriately enough, a hard question to 
frame. In recent year, I have come upon two genres within which to express the pedagogical counterparts 
of these epistemological mathematical themes: the novel and the Talmud. 
 
I came upon these genres when thinking about what implicit messages inhere in most texts. 
Though some of these messages are the result of poor writing technique, many seem to come close to 
being built into the genre itself RSM, in offering a slightly exaggerated account of texts, suggests 
valuable alternatives. 
 
Sequentiality and careful logical development are a text's hallmarks, [as is ] a 
general lackluster "story line." It is rare, for example, that readers are encouraged 
to figure out the relative importance of one idea in relation to others. 
Furthermore, it is usually assumed that the purpose of the text is to familiarize 
students with information or skills about which they supposedly know little or 
nothing. It is not only that they lack language to describe what will unfold, but 
rather that they supposedly possess no previous independent experience to enable 
them to appreciate the topic [in some vague or imprecise way]. There is also the 
implication that it is the text's responsibility is to be unconfusing and to provide 
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clear explanations. Behind this assumption is that the ideas presented not only are 
uncontroversial, but that they were born full blown with no labor pains to boot. 
In short, everything, including problems to be worked on, is "given" with little 
context for its evolution and little awareness that much is contestable. Most 
textbooks, especially in mathematics at the post elementary school level, convey 
little in the way of conflict, unsolvability, drama and emotionality. (p. 203) 
 
In seeking the novel as an alternative genre, I was influenced by some powerful philosophical 
analysis of story telling as a missing ingredient in the field of philosophy itself. Martha Nussbaum 
(1990), for example comments, 
 
How should one write, what words should one select, what forms and structures 
and organization, if one is pursuing understanding? ... Sometimes this is taken to 
be a trivial and uninteresting question. I ... claim that it is not. Style itself makes 
its claims, expresses its own sense of what matters. Literary form is not separable 
from philosophical content, but is, itself, a part of content-an integral part, then, 
of the search for and the statement of truth. ... But this suggests, too, that there 
may be some views of the world and how one should live in it-views, especially, 
that emphasize the world's surprising variety, its complexity and mysteriousness, 
its flawed and imperfect beauty--that cannot be fully and adequately stated in the 
language of conventional philosophical prose, a style remarkably flat and lacking 
in wonder --but only in a language and in forms themselves more complex, more 
allusive, more attentive to particulars (pp. 3-4) 
 
Robert Nozick (1990) points out that some literary figures have a reality about them even though 
they never existed and could not be touched, smelled or seen. Interestingly enough, the same can be said 
about mathematics. Who of us has not been enchanted by the "reality" of an infinite set that shares those 
qualities? I thus suggested that despite its traditional sense of reality, we have all had visions in our youth 
of reaching the end of the universe and wondering if we would fall off or if we would continue forever. 
 
Armed with some of these insights, I wrote a mathematical novel, appropriately entitled, Posing 
Mathematically (I 996b). It is about two teachers who come upon some unexpected mathematical and 
pedagogical ideas, and who decide to collaborate and to try to find a forum for their ideas. They 
encounter criticism for both the mathematics and pedagogy by colleagues and students. After considering 
alternative paths towards popularizing their ideas - such as applying for a National Science Foundation 
Grant, or giving talks at national meetings, they choose (in self-referential fashion) to write a novel!  
 
Motivated by some of the above criticism of text, I have found the Talmudic format to be an 
engaging source for the exploration of mathematical ideas. The Talmud is a sacred text and considered to 
be second only to the Bible in Jewish tradition. It actually consists of two main texts: The Mishna and the 
Gemora. The Mishna was produced in the second century A. D. and is an attempt to codify traditions, 
especially in relation to the Bible. The Gemora, produced in the fifth and sixth centuries is commentary 
on the Mishna. 
 
What is appealing about the Talmud is both its format and style of exposition. Some people have 
likened this two thousand-year-old tradition to the Internet. Rosen (1998, 2000) claims that "[The 
Talmud] bears a certain uncanny resemblance to a home page on the Internet, where nothing is whole in 
itself but where icons and text-boxes are doorways through which visitors pass into an infinity of 
cross-referenced texts and conversations" (1998, pp. 8-9). 
 
One of the most appealing aspects of the Talmud is that it combines careful descriptions with 
non-linearity. As a matter of fact, it is assumed as soon as anyone begins to read any section of the 
Talmud, that she has already read every other section (Lukinsky, 1987). 
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Each page is surrounded by commentary in the margins made by scholars conversing with each 
other over a period of hundreds of years. It is impossible to study any page of the Talmud without hearing 
the voices of generations past and without feeling an intimate connection with those rich traditions and 
debates. In addition to format, the style varies throughout. What begins with in an expository/didactic 
style soon becomes a story. In the appendix to RSM, I begin with a fanciful story that involves payment 
for corn seeds with calculation done in the sand. One of the protagonists calculates two numbers ending 
in zero by ignoring the O's and then appending them at the end. This is first (in the Mishna) presented as 
a non-controversial rule, but it is eventually (in the Gemora and commentary) viewed as problematic. 
Eventually there is a hint of the connection between this short-cut and the distributive principle. But no 
sooner is this done, then a story unfolds as described below: 
 
The Gemora stops its logical development and "out of the blue" begins to talk of 
a dream of one of the narrators whose daughter is pregnant (interpretive mode). 
He wonders about the gender of his unborn grandchild. He is then whisked away 
in a chariot and visits a different land that is in every way like his own, except for 
the fact that time and space are contracted. Everyone is considerably smaller, and 
events are played out in a fraction of the time it would take in his "real world." 
Without amniocentesis, he is thus able to discover in a few seconds the gender of 
his unborn grandchild (221). 
 
As the text continues, commentary in the margin begins to explore the connections between the 
rather simpleminded short-cut of adding numbers ending in zero and the narrator's concern over the 
gender of his forthcoming grandchild. Eventually, a connection is made between the "real world" of the 
story and the arithmetic short-cut. The dream world is to the "real world" as "lopping off” the zeros is to 
including them in the final calculation. Both realms depict the concept of an isomorphic structure, though 
it is explored and revealed without fanfare and without making use of technical machinery that usually 
introduces and obfuscates what that concept is all about. In the right-hand R/D sketch, information about 
the "real world" (R) is mapped onto the imaginary one (D) and then back to the real world in order to 
determine nine months early what the gender of the child will be. Here the operation in the real world as 
well as the imaginary one is one of mating (m). In the case of the left hand R/D sketch, the operation is 
that of addition, and the lopping off of numbers ending zero (in the R world) is depicted by movement to 
the D world and then back again to R. In the arithmetic example, it is possible to think of the distributive 
law as justifying the fanciful "lopping off” algorithm [(47 * 10) + (22 * 10) = (47 + 22)* 10] depicted in 
the sketch below if the mapping from R to D is from n to  (1 / 10) * n for any n in R that ends in 0. 
 
Thus, instead of performing step 5 immediately, it is possible in both cases to follow steps 1 -> 2 -> 3 -> 
4. 
 
All of this needs cleaning up if we are worried about precision; also the author might be in need 
of some degree of psychoanalysis for invoking a Mack Truck to pull a kiddy car (when lopping off the 
zeros might be explainable in simpler terms), as well as for seeking analogies with such powerful 
sexually charged imagery. I have found, however, that encouraging students to come up with such 
personal analogies, and to compare the images of their real world and emerging mathematical thinking 
with other students has enormous power. Comparing crude sketching of the sort invoked below enables 
them to come to understand the quite different intellectual functions served by playful imagery of a 
personal nature and formal/technical machinery. It has enabled many of them to see proof as just one 
element of the mathematical landscape, and to define what some of the other frequently suppressed ones 
might be. 
 
I have taught several courses in which students reacted to and then created Talmudic text around 
mathematical ideas of their own choosing. (RSM and elaborated in Brown, 2002). Below is a comment 
made by one of my students in a secular Talmud course. He was a private person, who had just begun to 
teach, loved nothing more than solving mathematical problems that were "given" and who, before 
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engaging in the Talmudic experience, detested the prospect of writing essays -especially ones that were to 
be introspective. I offer this reaction not for self-serving purposes, but to sensitize my colleagues to the 
frequently hidden desire that many of our students have to see themselves in personal terms in relation to 
subject matter even when they would have us believe otherwise. 
 
This is truly a sad time. Yet still a time to rejoice. The semester is over. Yet so 
much has to be done. I am trying to think back to what I have immediately 
learned , and accepting that in the future, I will inevitably see more. One of the 
most peculiar things I have begun to develop, and which I credit this class. is a 
better sense of humor and love of life in general. I had mentioned to Dr. Brown 
about laughing until crying and bodily convulsions set in. Some of the critical 
analysis skills I have picked up in this course have opened up these venues of 
humor. This course is titled for mathematics education, and I feel I have learned a 
lot of ways to improve upon my mathematics teaching. But I feel that most of 
what I learned was how to be a better person. ... I feel that what this course has 
done is keep the playful spirit of the child in our education, and reminded us to 
keep it in our classrooms and our lives (Brown, 2002, p. 237). 
 
The Talmudic experience invited students to uncover multiple perspectives on a variety of issues, 
to experience intense deliberation without being driven by the need to be right, to see story-telling as well 
as explaining as an important element of education, and to be tolerant of delayed or non-existent 
resolution. Most importantly, they began to listen to new and previously hidden voices within each of 
them and to engage in the risky behavior of uncovering and incorporating aspects of their lives that had 
previously been seen as isolated and educationally irrelevant. In short, they began to see mathematics, 
themselves and education in a more humanistic light. 
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